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Abstract
This paper conducts a quantitative investigation of the role of reserve requirements as a
macroprudential policy tool. We build a monetary DSGE model with a banking sector in
which (i) an agency problem between households and banks leads to endogenous capital con-
straints for banks in obtaining funds from households, (ii) banks are subject to time-varying
reserve requirements that countercyclically respond to expected credit growth, (iii) households
face cash-in-advance constraints, requiring them to hold real balances, and (iv) standard pro-
ductivity and money growth shocks are two sources of aggregate uncertainty. We calibrate
the model to the Turkish economy which is representative of using reserve requirements as a
macroprudential policy tool recently. We also consider the impact of ﬁnancial shocks that aﬀect
the net worth of ﬁnancial intermediaries. We ﬁnd that (i) the time-varying required reserve
ratio rule countervails the negative eﬀects of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism triggered by
adverse macroeconomic and ﬁnancial shocks, (ii) in response to TFP and money growth shocks,
countercyclical reserves policy reduces the volatilities of key real macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
variables compared to ﬁxed reserves policy over the business cycle, and (iii) a time-varying
reserve requirement policy is welfare superior to a ﬁxed reserve requirement policy. The credit
policy is most eﬀective when the economy is hit by a ﬁnancial shock. Time-varying required
reserves policy reduces the intertemporal distortions created by the credit spreads at expense of
generating higher inﬂation volatility, indicating an interesting trade-oﬀ between price stability
and ﬁnancial stability.
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1 Introduction
Policymakers in both advanced and emerging countries have been exercising a variety of measures
to mitigate the transmission of ﬁnancial disruptions to the real sector. To that end, frictions in
the ﬁnancial sector and macroprudential policy instruments have been the focal point of the recent
literature on macroeconomic dynamics and policy. Among many, reserve requirements have been
used extensively as a macroprudential policy tool in several emerging countries, recently. China,
Brazil, Malaysia, Peru, Colombia and Turkey are some of the countries among others who have
used this tool mostly to curb excessive credit growth in upturns along with other reasons.1 In
terms of their main objectives, they employ reserve requirements either as a monetary policy tool
to achieve price stability or as a macroprudential policy tool to foster ﬁnancial stability, or both.
In this paper, we explicitly focus on the second objective: ﬁnancial stability.
Central banks use reserve requirements to achieve ﬁnancial stability in the following manner as
Montoro and Moreno (2011) noted: they can raise reserve requirements to contain credit growth
in the boom part of the business cycle in order to counteract ﬁnancial imbalances in the econ-
omy or in an economic downturn, they can lower reserve requirements to utilize reserve buﬀers
accumulated during the boom part, having the banking sector extend more credit to non-ﬁnancial
businesses. Therefore, reserve requirements can be used as a cyclical policy instrument to ease
credit ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnancial sector, and hence to stabilize the real economy.
The goal of this study is to investigate the eﬀectiveness of reserve requirements that respond
to expected credit growth in moderating the real and ﬁnancial cycles of an economy. We do so in
a model where real and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations are ampliﬁed by a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
Speciﬁcally, we explore the stabilizing role of reserve requirements as a credit policy tool, on the
transmission mechanism of productivity, monetary and ﬁnancial shocks. The results suggest that a
time-varying reserve requirement policy mitigates the ﬂuctuations in key macroeconomic variables
and improves welfare vis-a-vis a ﬁxed reserve requirement policy.2
We build a monetary DSGE model in which the ﬁnancial intermediation between depositors
and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are explicitly described as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this model, the
ampliﬁcation of TFP and money growth shocks are larger due to the so-called ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism built in endogenous capital constraints faced by ﬁnancial intermediaries. Endogenous
capital constraints emerge from an agency problem assumption which posits that banks might
divert a fraction of assets that they have expanded to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. When this is realized
by depositors, a bank run is initiated causing the bank to liquidate. Therefore, the contracting
problem between depositors and banks requires an incentive compatibility condition to hold, i.e.
the liquidation value of banks must be larger than or equal to the amount of diverted funds. As
1See Montoro and Moreno (2011), Montoro (2011), Gray (2011), Glocker and Towbin (2012) for the discussion of
country experiences.
2At this point, we acknowledge that cancelling reserve requirements altogether might improve aggregate welfare
of the economy. However, mostly due to precautionary reasons, positive reserve requirements do exist in practice
and since it is beyond the scope of this paper, we do not bring any micro-foundation to this institutional framework
in what follows.
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expected, in this environment, depositors abstain from providing as much funds as they would
have provided under the absence of this agency problem.
We extend the basic ﬁnancial intermediation framework to one in which “money” is explicitly
modelled via a cash-in-advance constraint. Arguably, explicit accounting of “quantity of money”
is topical contemporaneously because it has been used as an operative monetary policy instrument
to combat the recent global ﬁnancial crisis by many central banks. Consequently, we introduce
required reserves into the model in a very tractable way, since we have the concept of a monetary
base.
We calibrate the model to the Turkish economy which exempliﬁes the use of reserve require-
ments as a macroprudential tool since the end of 2010 (see ﬁgure 1). In particular, the Central
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT, hereafter) has increased weighted average of required
reserves ratio – henceforth, RRR – from 5% to 13% between the period October 2010 and April
2011, in a stepwise manner. This period also coincides with the aftermath of the second phase
of quantitative easing implemented by monetary authorities in a number of advanced economies.
Evidently, this period is characterized by an increase in the risk appetite of global investors and
excessive credit growth in emerging economies such as Turkey. On the other hand, same measure
of RRR has been reduced to about 10% around November 2010 by the CBRT following the debt
crisis of the Euro area.
Our quantitative exercise involves comparing a “ﬁxed RRR economy” in which the RRR is
calibrated to its “long-run” value preceding the interventions of the CBRT and the “time-varying
RRR economy” in which the RRR is countercyclical with respect to expected credit growth.3
We also simulate the model under moderate and aggressive required reserve policies in order to
understand the eﬀectiveness of the policy as a macroprudential policy tool.
There are three main results of the paper: First, the time-varying required reserve ratio rule
countervails the negative eﬀects of adverse macroeconomic and ﬁnancial shocks and the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism on real and ﬁnancial variables. As a result, we conclude that RRRs might
be used as a macroprudential policy tool in an economy that exhibits ﬁnancial frictions. Second, in
response to TFP and money growth shocks, countercyclical reserves policy reduces the volatilities
of key variables such as output, consumption, investment, bank credit, credit spreads and asset
prices in comparison with ﬁxed reserves policy. This happens because the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of the
ﬁnancial sector is mitigated by time-varying reserve requirements. Third, a time-varying reserve
requirement policy is welfare superior to a ﬁxed reserve requirement policy.
The workings of the model might be elaborated in greater detail as follows: An adverse TFP
shock reduces the demand of ﬁnancial intermediaries for equity and drives down its price. The
collapse in asset prices feeds back into the endogenous capital constraints of intermediaries and
causes banks’ net worth to decline. Accordingly, the shortage in loanable funds, which manifests
itself as a rise in credit spreads, combined with the collapse in asset prices causes investment to
3We also conduct the analysis of a model economy with zero required reserves policy. However, since the dynamics
of this case strongly resemble those of the fixed RRR economy, we don’t include it in the paper in order to save
space.
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decline substantially. When the RRR is ﬁxed, the dynamics of reserves resembles that of deposits.
When the countercyclical RRR policy is in place, the fall in bank credit led by the adverse
TFP shock calls for a reduction in the RRR. This induces banks to substitute loans for reserves
on the assets side of the balance sheet, because the cost of raising external ﬁnance is lower with
a smaller RRR. Accordingly, larger supply of funds extended by banks mitigates the collapse in
investment and asset prices, countervailing the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. This also limits
the rise in credit spreads, which is an intertemporal distortion created by ﬁnancial frictions in
the consumption-savings margin of workers. The downward response of RRR reduces the demand
for monetary base and shoots up inﬂation on impact. Therefore, the credit policy mitigates the
ﬁnancial accelerator at the expense of higher inﬂation. However, since this immediate surge is
transitory and driven by the reserves policy, the model implies an undershooting of inﬂation in the
following periods. This implies a substitution of consumption for leisure on the part of forward
looking households and labor supply increases in contrast with the ﬁxed RRR economy. Increased
labor supply combined with a stronger trajectory for capital mitigates the collapse in output
signiﬁcantly.
A positive money growth shock increases inﬂation and crowds out deposits and consumption for
leisure in our cash-in-advance speciﬁcation. Therefore, a positive money growth produces similar
dynamics to that of TFP shocks in the model. Consequently, the counter-cyclical RRR policy rule
stabilizes key ﬁnancial and real variables in response to money growth shocks again at the expense
of higher inﬂation.
Lastly, we run a ﬁnancial crisis experiment in which we consider an exogenous decline in the net
worth of ﬁnancial intermediaries as in Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), Meh and Moran (2010),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Curdia and Woodford (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010),
Iacoviello (2010), and Mimir (2011). This shock crudely captures loan losses, asset write-downs
or asset revaluations that we observe in the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Most importantly, it might be
interpreted as an exogenous variation in the risk appetite of international investors, that may have
destabilizing eﬀects on the ﬁnancial system of an economy such as Turkey.
Although the initial decline in banks’ net worth led by the ﬁnancial shock is exogenous, there
will be second round eﬀects that amplify the collapse in internal ﬁnance of banks. This would
create a shortage of bank credit and would drive a drop in investment, and in the price of capital.
Banks then increase their demand for external ﬁnancing (i.e. increase their deposit demand) to
compensate for the decline in bank net worth. This causes reserves to increase and drives down
inﬂation, pointing out a diﬀerence from the case of TFP and money growth shocks on part of the
nominal dynamics. Yet, since the shock is transitory, inﬂation overshoots in the period that follows
the shock and workers’ expectations regarding the hike in future inﬂation causes hours to decline
substantially on impact. Therefore, output collapses together with investment.
Credit policy in response to ﬁnancial shock calls for a reduction in the RRR and is again
inﬂationary in the sense that the reduction in inﬂation on impact becomes substantially lower.
Accordingly, overshooting in inﬂation becomes less as well, limiting the collapse in hours. In this
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manner, the analysis shows that the counter-cyclical RRR policy has a stabilizing eﬀect in response
to ﬁnancial shocks in addition to TFP and money growth shocks and might be used by the central
bank as a macroprudential policy tool.
Related Literature
Our work is mostly related to the studies by Glocker and Towbin (2012) and Montoro (2011) who
analyze the role of reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy tool. Glocker and Towbin
(2012) augment required reserves as an additional policy instrument and variations in loans as an
additional target into an open-economy model with nominal rigidities and ﬁnancial frictions. Their
results imply that requirements are in favor of price stability objective only if ﬁnancial frictions are
non-trivial and are more eﬀective if there is a ﬁnancial stability objective and debt is denominated
in foreign currency. In their work, due to the endogeneity of monetary base, an increase in the
RRR increases loan-deposit spreads only if the remuneration of reserves is below the market rate.
Since they obtain impact of policy change on consumption and investment, the overall eﬀect on
aggregate demand and inﬂation is ambiguous.
Montoro (2011) introduces counter-cyclical RRR policy tools in an otherwise standard New-
Keynesian setting that introduce collateral and liquidity constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(2008) and maturity mismatch frictions as in Benes and Lees (2010). He ﬁnds that RRRs contain
the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system in response to demand shocks but not under supply shocks.
The main diﬀerences of our work with these papers is that we model ﬁnancial frictions a-la’ Gertler
and Karadi (2011) that introduces an agency problem between depositors and bankers and that
involves equity ﬁnancing of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. An important deviation from the former study is
that we also explore the role of RRRs in response to ﬁnancial shocks and from the latter study
is that we ﬁnd that RRRs might be stabilizing even under supply shocks. From an alternative
perspective, our ﬁnding that credit policy implemented by RRRs is the most eﬀective in response
to ﬁnancial shocks is in line with the ﬁnding of Glocker and Towbin (2012) that RRRs are mostly
eﬀective when ﬁnancial frictions are relevant.
Another closely related paper to the current study is the work of Christensen et al. (2011)
which explores the role of countercyclical bank capital regulations as a macroprudential policy
tool. Similar to our experiment, they compare time-varying and constant bank capital regulations
and ﬁnd that the former regime reduces volatilities of real variables and bank lending. However,
as they state in their paper, the type of ﬁnancial friction that they introduce diﬀers from that of
Gertler and Karadi (2011) in that it is driven by asymmetric information between bankers and
their creditors a la’ Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), instead of limited commitment. While the
macroprudential regulation in their work is focused on the “size” of the balance sheet, in our work
it is focused on the “composition of the assets side” of the balance sheet.
Our work also has linkages to closed economy frameworks of Kashyap and Stein (2012) and
Curdia and Woodford (2011) in which the remuneration of reserves has been studied. Yet, it is
obvious that reserves policy studied in these papers are more related to the central bank balance
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sheet considerations of the Federal Reserve at the onset of the sub-prime ﬁnancial crisis and do not
have the focus of containing excessive credit growth in contrast with the focus of our work. From
another perspective, the descriptive work of Gray (2011) on recent reserve requirement policy
experiences and the work of Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) on the use of required reserves for
stability of international capital ﬂows relates to the current paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy and
characterizes equilibrium. Section 3 undertakes the quantitative analysis regarding the dynamics
introduced by macroeconomic and ﬁnancial shocks and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy is inhabited by households, banks, ﬁnal goods producers, capital producers,
and a government. Time is discrete. Two ﬁnancial frictions characterize the economy. First, market
segmentation ensures that households who are the ultimate savers in the economy cannot directly
lend to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This assumption makes the banking sector essential for transferring
funds from ultimate savers (households) to ultimate borrowers (ﬁnal goods producers). Second,
banking sector is characterized by credit frictions that are modelled a la Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Households face a cash-in-advance constraint, which makes them hold real balances, leading to the
existence of monetary equilibria. Finally, banks are subject to time-varying reserve requirements
imposed by the central bank, which reacts countercyclically to expected credit expansion in the
economy. Below is a detailed description of economic agents that reside in this model economy.
2.1 Households
The population consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived identical households. We assume that
each household is composed of a worker and a banker who perfectly insure each other. Workers
supply labor to the ﬁnal goods producers and assumed to deposit their savings in the banks owned
by the banker member of “other” households.4
A representative household maximizes the discounted lifetime utility earned from consumption,
ct and leisure, lt,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ct, lt
)
(1)
where 0 < β < 1 the subjective discount factor and E is the expectation operator. Households
face the following ﬂow budget constraint,
ct + bt+1 +
Mt+1
Pt
= wt(1− lt) +Rtbt +
Mt
Pt
+Πt +
Tt
Pt
(2)
4This assumption is useful in making the agency problem that we introduce in section 2.2 more realistic.
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where bt is the beginning of period t balance of deposits held at commercial banks, Pt is the general
nominal price level, wt is the real wage earned per labor hour, Rt is the gross risk free deposits rate,
Πt is the proﬁts remitted from the ownership of banks and capital producers and Tt is lump-sum
transfers remitted by the government.
Households face a cash-in-advance constraint which reﬂects the timing assumption that asset
markets open ﬁrst as in Cooley and Hansen (1989):
ct ≤
Mt
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
+Rtbt − bt+1 (3)
Solution of the utility maximization problem of households yield the optimality conditions
below,
uc(t) = βRt+1Etuc(t+ 1) (4)
ul(t)
Ptwt
= βEt
{
uc(t+ 1)
Pt+1
}
(5)
Condition (4) is a standard consumption-savings optimality condition, which equates marginal
beneﬁt of consumption to the expected discounted beneﬁt of saving in deposits. Equation (5) on
the other hand is a non-standard consumption-leisure optimality condition due to the existence of
cash-in-advance friction which transforms the trade-oﬀ between the two into an inter-temporal one.
Speciﬁcally, increasing leisure demand by 1 unit reduces savings in cash by P
P ′
= 11+π′ future units
because the yield of cash balances is deﬂated by inﬂation. Therefore, the utility cost of leisure is
measured only in terms of future utility foregone by facing a tighter cash-in-advance constraint in
the next period.
2.2 Banks
The modelling of ﬁnancial sector closely follows that in Gertler and Karadi (2011). To summarize
the key ingredients, we denote the period t balance sheet of a bank j as,
qtsjt = (1− rrt)bjt+1 + njt (6)
The right hand side of the balance sheet denotes the resources of bank j, namely, net worth,
njt and deposits, bt+1 needed to ﬁnance its credit extension to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, qtsjt. The loans
to ﬁrms serve as state-contingent claims sjt towards the ownership of ﬁrms and are traded at the
market price qt. Note that the bank can only loan (1− rrt) fraction of deposits to the ﬁrms where
rrt is the required reserve ratio set by the central bank as we describe below. The balance sheet
of banks described in equation (6) imply an evolution equation for net worth as follows:
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njt+1 =
[
Rkt+1 −
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)]
qtsjt +
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)
njt (7)
It is evident in equation (7) that an increase in the required reserve ratio rrt decreases the
returns to assets and increases the returns to equity all else equal. That induces banks to substitute
internal ﬁnancing (nt) for external ﬁnancing (bt+1).
Bankers have a ﬁnite life and survive to the next period with probability θ.5 At the end of each
period 1− θ number of new bankers are born and are remitted ǫ1−θ of the net worth owned by the
exiting bankers. Bankers’ objective is to maximize the present discounted value of the terminal
net worth of their ﬁnancial ﬁrm, Vjt, by choosing the amount of claims against the ﬁrm ownership,
sjt. That is,
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1−θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i
{[
Rkt+1+i −
(
Rt+1+i − rrt+i
1− rrt+i
)]
qt+isjt+i +
(
Rt+1+i − rrt+i
1− rrt+i
)
njt+i
}
(8)
The ﬁnite life of bankers, θ < 1, ensures that bankers never accumulate enough net worth to ﬁnance
all their equity purchases of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms via internal funds so that they have to borrow from
households in the form of deposits.
The key feature of the ﬁnancial sector unfolds around a moral hazard problem between banks
and households: In this model of banking, households believe that banks might divert λ fraction
of their total assets for their own beneﬁt. This might be thought of as investing part of qtsjt
in excessively risky projects that go bankrupt eventually and not paying back the corresponding
liability to the depositor. In this case, depositors shall cause a bank run and lead to the liquidation
of the bank altogether. Therefore, bankers’ optimal plan regarding the choice of sjt at any date t
should satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint,
Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (9)
This inequality suggests that the loss of bankers, Vjt, from diverting the funds and investing
them in risky projects that would likely fail should be greater than or equal to the diverted portion
of the assets, λqtsjt.
By using an envelope condition and algebraic manipulation, one can write the optimal value of
banks as
V ∗jt = νtqts
∗
jt + ηtn
∗
jt (10)
where the recursive objects,6
5This assumption ensures that bankers do not reach to a point in which they only self-finance.
6Proofs of equations (10), (11), and (12) are available in technical appendix upon request.
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νt = Et
{
(1− θ)βΛt,t+1
[
Rkt+1 −
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)]
+ θβΛt,t+1χtνt+1
}
(11)
and
ηt = Et
{
(1− θ)βΛt,t+1
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)
+ θβΛt,t+1̺tηt+1
}
(12)
represent the marginal values of relaxing credit and accumulating net worth for the bank respec-
tively. The growth rates of assets and net worth of banks are denoted with χt =
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
and
̺t =
njt+1
njt
.
One can obtain the following by combining equations (9) and (10):
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt ≥ λqtsjt (13)
Given that ηtnjt is strictly greater than zero, νt ≥ λ would imply a strict inequality in (13).
Therefore νt < λ should hold for (13) to be an equality. Moreover, νt must be greater than zero for
the banks to increase loans until the above incentive compatibility constraint binds. This is always
the case under reasonable values of parameters in our model νt < λ, which in turn produces the
endogenous borrowing constraint for the bank as follows:
qtsjt =
ηt
λ− νt
njt = κtnjt. (14)
This is the case in which the loss of bankers in the event of liquidation is just equal to the
amount of loans that they can divert. This endogenous constraint which emerges from the costly
enforcement problem described above ensures that banks’ leverage might always be equal to ηt
λ−νt
and is decreasing with the fraction of funds (λ) that depositors believe that banks will divert.
We conﬁne our interest to equilibria in which all households behave symmetrically so that we
can aggregate equation (14) over j and obtain the following aggregate relationship:
qtst = κtnt (15)
where st and nt represent aggregate levels of banks’ assets and net worth, respectively. Equation
(15) shows that aggregate credit in this economy can only be up to an endogenous multiple of
aggregate bank capital. Also, ﬂuctuations in asset prices (qt) will feedback into ﬂuctuations in
bank capital via this relationship. This will be the source of ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in
our model.
The evolution of aggregate net worth depends on that of the surviving bankers (net+1) and the
start-up funds of the new entrants (nnt+1):
9
nt+1 = net+1 + nnt+1. (16)
The start-up funds for new entrants are equal to ǫ1−θ fraction of exiting banks’ net worth,
(1− θ)nt.
7 Therefore,
nnt+1 = ǫnt (17)
The fact that θ fraction of banks survive over next period equates the net worth of surviving
banks to the following:
net+1 = θ
{[
Rkt+1 −
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)]
κt +
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)}
nt (18)
One can sum up equations (17) and (18) to obtain the evolution of net worth for the entire set
of banks:
nt+1 =
{
θ
([
Rkt+1 −
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)]
κt +
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
))
+ ǫ
}
nt (19)
Equation (19) shows that the evolution of net worth depends on eﬀective spread and leverage
ratio of banks.
2.3 Firms
Firms produce the consumption good by using physical capital and labor as production factors.
They operate with a constant returns to scale technology F (., .) that is subject to total factor
productivity shocks, zt
yt = exp(zt)F (kt, ht) (20)
where
zt+1 = ρzzt + ǫzt+1 (21)
with zero mean and constant variance innovations, ǫzt+1.
Firms ﬁnance capital at date t by issuing claims st to ﬁnancial intermediaries at the price of
capital and acquire capital kt+1 from capital producers. Therefore,
qtst = qtkt+1 (22)
7This assumption is slightly different from that in Gertler and Karadi (2011). They assume that the net worth
of newly entering bankers is a fraction of banks’ total assets rather than its net worth. Since the fraction is small, it
does not change the main results of the paper significantly.
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with qt is the market price of the ﬁrms’ equity and capital.
Banks’ claim against the ownership of the ﬁrm pays out its dividend via the marginal product
of capital in the next period. Hence, the cost of credit to the ﬁrm is state-contingent. As a result,
the cost of credit to the ﬁrm must satisfy
Rkt =
ztFk(kt, ht) + qt(1− δ)
qt−1
(23)
Finally, the optimal labor demand of the ﬁrm must satisfy the usual static condition,
wt = exp(zt)Fh(kt, ht) (24)
which equates marginal product of labor to the marginal cost of it.
2.4 Capital Producers
Capital producers are introduced in order to obtain variation in the price of capital which is
necessary for the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism to operate. To that end, capital producers
provide physical capital to the ﬁrms and repair the depreciated capital and incur the cost of
investment. Consequently, the optimization problem of capital producers reads,
max
it
qtkt+1 − qt(1− δ)kt − it (25)
subject to the capital accumulation technology,
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt +Φ
( it
kt
)
kt (26)
where the function Φ(·) represents the capital adjustment cost. The optimality condition that
emerges from the solution to this problem is the well-known “q” relation that pins down the price
of capital,
qt =
[
Φ′
( it
kt
)]−1
(27)
2.5 Government
The government is essentially responsible for coordinating monetary policy. To that end, it controls
the supply of money M0t+1 and determines the required reserve ratio rrt. Any growth of the
monetary base is remitted to households in the form of lump-sum transfers, Tt. The monetary
base grows at the rate µt,
M0t+1 = exp(µt)M0t (28)
where the growth rate of money supply is subject to zero mean, constant variance normally dis-
tributed innovations so that,
11
µt+1 = (1− ρµ)µ¯ + ρµµt + ǫµt+1 (29)
In order to contain the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, the government uses required reserves
as a macroprudential rule. Speciﬁcally, the required reserves ratio is assumed to follow a rule that
reacts to the expected growth rate of bank credit at date t+1 compared to its level in the current
period.
rrt = r¯r + φEt [log(qt+1st+1)− log(qtst)] (30)
where, r¯r is the steady-state value of the required reserves ratio and φ > 0. Consequently, the
central bank increases the eﬀective proﬁt to banks of extending new loans when credit in the aggre-
gate economy is shrinking, and vice versa. Within this framework, the money market equilibrium
turns out as the following condition:
M0t+1 = Mt+1 + Ptrrtbt+1 (31)
where Pt is the general price level of the consumption good. Since the left hand side is exogenously
determined by the central bank, equilibrium in the money market might call for adjustments in
price level in response to ﬂuctuations in reserves.
2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
Notice that nominal monetary base and prices grow constantly in this model, which renders
the equations listed above non-stationary. Therefore, following Cooley and Hansen (1989), we
make the model stationary by applying the following normalizations: P̂t = Pt/M0t+1 and mˆt =
Mt+1/(P̂tM0t+1) and solve the model locally around a deterministic steady state.
A competitive equilibrium of this model economy is deﬁned by sequences of allocations {ct, kt+1,
it, lt, ht, st, nt, net, nnt, bt+1,Λt,t+1, νt, ηt, κt, ρt,t+1, χt,t+1, mˆt+1, πt}
∞
t=0, prices {qt, Rkt+1, Rt+1, wt, P̂t}
∞
t=0,
shock processes {zt, µt}
∞
t=0 and the government policy {rrt}
∞
t=0 that satisfy the following optimality
and market clearing conditions:
Λt,t+1 =
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
(32)
1 = βEtRt+1Λt,t+1 (33)
ct =
exp(µt)− 1 + mˆtPˆt
Pˆtexp(µt)
+Rtbt − bt+1 (34)
ul(t)
wtPˆt
= βEt
{
uc(t+ 1)
Pˆt+1exp(µt+1)
}
(35)
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κt =
ηt
λ− νt
(36)
qtst = κtnt (37)
qtst = (1− rrt)bt+1 + nt (38)
̺t,t+1 =
(
Rkt+1 −
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)
κt +
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
(39)
χt,t+1 = ̺t,t+1
κt+1
κt
(40)
net = θ̺t−1,tnt−1 (41)
nnt = ǫnt−1 (42)
nt = net + nnt (43)
νt = Et
{
(1− θ)βΛt,t+1
(
Rkt+1 −
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)
+ βΛt,t+1θχt,t+1νt+1
}
(44)
ηt = Et
{
(1− θ)βΛt,t+1
(
Rt+1 − rrt
1− rrt
)
+ βΛt,t+1θ̺t,t+1ηt+1
}
(45)
wt = exp(zt)Fh(kt, ht) (46)
Rkt =
exp(zt)Fk(kt, ht) + qt(1− δ)
qt−1
(47)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt +Φ
( it
kt
)
kt (48)
qt =
[
Φ′
( it
kt
)]−1
(49)
exp(zt)F (kt, ht) = ct + it (50)
st = kt+1 (51)
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1 = lt + ht (52)
exp(πt) = exp(µt)
P̂t
P̂t−1
(53)
zt+1 = ρzzt + ǫzt+1 (54)
µt+1 = (1− ρµ)µ¯ + ρµµt + ǫµt+1 (55)
rrt = r¯r + φEt [log(qt+1st+1)− log(qtst)] (56)
1
P̂t
= mˆt+1 + rrtbt+1 (57)
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Functional Forms
Preferences: We use a standard CRRA utility function and separable utility for leisure:
u(ct, lt) =
c1−γt
1− γ
− ψ
(1 − lt)
1+ν
1 + ν
(58)
with γ > 1, ψ, ν > 0.
Production: Firms produce according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production
function:
exp(zt)F (kt, ht) = exp(zt)k
α
t h
1−α
t (59)
with 0 < α < 1.
Capital Producers: Capital producers are subject to a convex adjustment cost function:
Φ
( it
kt
)
=
ϕ
2
[ it
kt
− δ
]2
(60)
The parameter values used in the quantitative analysis are reported in table 1. The preference
and production parameters are standard in business cycle literature. The share of capital in the
production function is set to 0.4, and the capital adjustment cost parameter is 2.75. We borrow
the standard values of γ and v from literature as 2 and 2, respectively. We take the quarterly
discount factor, β, as 0.9885 to match the 2006-2011 average annualized real deposit rate, 4.73%,
in Turkey. We pick the relative utility weight of labor, ψ, to ﬁx hours worked in steady state, h, at
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Table 1: Paremeter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Value Target
Preferences
Quarterly discount factor (β) 0.9885 Annualized real deposit rate (4.73%)
Relative risk aversion (γ) 2
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (v) 2 Literature
Relative utility weight of leisure (ψ) 15.182 Hours worked (0.33)
Production Technology
Share of capital in output (α) 0.4 Labor share of output (0.64)
Capital adjustment cost parameter (ϕ) 2.75 Relative volatility of investment = 2.25
Depreciation rate of capital (δ) 0.037 Average annual ratio of investment to capital (14.8%)
Government
Steady-state value of RRR (r¯r) 0.05 Pre macroprudential policy period
Adjustment parameter in the RRR rule (φ) 5.15 Standard deviation of differences in RRR for 2009:4-
2012:2 (1.73%)
Financial Intermediaries
Fraction of diverted loans (λ) 0.5 Annual commercial & industrial loan spread (1.96%)
Prop. transfer to the entering bankers (ǫ) 0.001 5.71% of aggregate net worth
Survival probability of the bankers (θ) 0.962 Capital adequacy ratio of 16% for commercial banks
Shock Processes
Persistence of TFP process (ρz) 0.9821 Estimated from detrended log TFPt = ρz log TFPt−1 + ǫzt
Std. deviation of productivity shocks (σz) 0.0183
Persistence of money growth process (ρµ) 0.5702 Estimated from log∆M1t = (1 − ρµ)µ¯+ ρµ log∆M1t−1 + ǫµt
Std. deviation of money growth shocks (σµ)0.0275
one third of the available time. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital is set to 3.7% to match
the 1987-2011 average annual investment to capital ratio of 14.8% in Turkey.
Parameters related to the ﬁnancial sector are calibrated to match ﬁnancial statistics of the
Turkish economy in the period 2006-2011. We set ǫ to 0.001 so that the proportional transfer to
newly entering bankers is 5.71% of aggregate net worth. We pick the fraction of diverted funds,
λ, and the survival probability, θ, simultaneously to match the following two targets: an average
interest rate spread of 48 basis points, which is the historical average of the diﬀerence between
the quarterly commercial and industrial loan rates and the quarterly deposit rate from 2006:Q1 to
2011:Q4, and an average capital adequacy ratio of 16%, which is the historical average of Turkish
commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratio for the same period.8 The resulting values for λ and
θ are 0.5 and 0.962, respectively. The benchmark model involves a macroprudential policy rule
illustrated in equation (28) which does not alter the steady state of the model but aﬀects the
dynamics around it. We calibrate the value of the response parameter of the RRR rule, φ, to
8The legal target of risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio set by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
in Turkey is 8%, however, commercial banks in Turkey maintain 16% for this ratio in practice.
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5.15 in order to match the standard deviation of the diﬀerences in RRR of 1.73% for the Turkish
economy in the period 2009:4-2012:2.9
We estimate an AR(1) process for the log of TFP for the period 1988:Q2-2011:Q2 and ﬁnd a
persistence of, ρz = 0.9821, and a standard deviation of innovations to TFP, σz = 0.0183. The
money growth process on the other hand is estimated for the period 2003:Q1-2011:Q4.10 Estimation
results implied a persistence of, ρz = 0.5702, and a standard deviation of innovations to money
growth shocks, σµ = 0.0275.
With the parameterized economy, we ﬁrst illustrate the role of ﬁnancial accelerator driven by
credit frictions in the banking sector. We then study the dynamics of the model by focusing on
impulse responses to one standard deviation negative productivity and positive money growth
shocks in environments that involve alternative required reserves policies. We also document
implications of using a time-varying required reserves ratio in terms of its eﬀect on the volatilities
of real and ﬁnancial variables in order to understand its eﬀectiveness as a macroprudential policy
tool. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of alternative RRR policies.
3.2 Findings
In the following subsections, we ﬁrst display the role of ﬁnancial accelerator by comparing the usual
cash-in-advance model with the model described in section 2. We then compare the dynamics of
negative TFP and positive money growth shocks under two model economies with time-varying
and ﬁxed RRR policies. Lastly, we run a ﬁnancial crisis experiment, in which the net worth of
banks are hit by a one-time exogenous shock, and compare the implications of the two reserve
requirement regimes.11
3.2.1 Amplifying Effect of Financial Frictions
The dashed and straight plots in ﬁgures 2 and 3 represent the economy described in section 2 and
the standard cash-in-advance model with no ﬁnancial frictions, respectively. Required reserves
ratio in the former economy is set to zero to isolate the impact of ﬁnancial frictions.
Figure 2 below illustrates that the collapse in output, investment, price of capital and loan-
deposit spreads is ampliﬁed when ﬁnancial frictions are in place. We especially want to highlight
the almost tripling increase in the reduction of investment and asset prices and 250 basis points of
increase in the credit spreads in annualized terms. The last one is even more striking because in
the economy with no ﬁnancial frictions, there is no-arbitrage between return to capital and return
to deposits. The evident ampliﬁcation owes to the reduced demand of banks for deposits in case
of lower productivity. This stems from the decline in the return to state-contingent equity issued
by ﬁrms when productivity is lower. This depresses the price of equity issued by ﬁrms and results
9This is the period in which the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey changed the RRR for macroprudential
purposes.
10The choice of estimation period reflects the structural disinflation that the Turkish economy has experienced,
see Sunel (2011).
11We also analyzed the case with zero reserve requirements policy. Since the dynamics are quite similar to a fixed
RRR regime, we do not report those results, which are available upon request.
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in a collapse in the value of funds provided to them. As a result, ﬁrms acquire less capital and
investment declines more.
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics in response to a positive money growth shock. An important
feature of this cash-in-advance economy is that as equations (3) (with equality) and (5) suggest,
investment and leisure act as cash and credit goods in our model, respectively. Therefore, when
inﬂation rises following a positive money growth shock, labor supply and investment decreases
causing a decline in output. We again obtain ampliﬁed responses of investment, asset prices,
output and credit spreads on impact following the shock. Yet, the trajectory of all variables except
the last appears to be similar to the economy with no ﬁnancial frictions. The ampliﬁed response of
investment is coupled with larger degree of declines in asset prices and credit spreads as in the case
of TFP shocks. We also note that the quantitative impact of monetary shocks are much smaller
compared to TFP shocks, which is a typical property of CIA models.
We now analyze the implications of the RRR policy on the dynamics of real, ﬁnancial, and
monetary variables. In ﬁgures 4 and 5, we compare the dynamics of these variables in response to
one standard deviation negative TFP and positive money growth shocks. In ﬁgure 6 we explore
the implications of RRR policy in a ﬁnancial crisis scenario. The speciﬁc ﬁnancial disruption is a
balance sheet shock that bankers face as in mostly recent literature.12
In ﬁgures 4 to 6, the dashed plots correspond to the benchmark economy with the countercycli-
cal RRR rule and the straight plots correspond to an economy with ﬁxed RRR. The dynamics of
the economy with no reserves closely resemble those with a ﬁxed RRR. Therefore for space con-
siderations, we do not discuss them here and only present the comparison of ﬁxed RRR economy
with the benchmark economy that displays a countercyclical RRR.13 Unless otherwise is stated,
the numbers in the y-axes correspond to percentage deviations of variables from their long-run
values. For the case of inﬂation and RRR, we plot percentage “point changes” and for the case
of credit spreads we plot “basis point changes” in annualized terms. In addition, we explore the
impact of implementing aggressive credit policy rules by increasing the response parameter φ. In
these experiments, as anticipated, the impact of the time-varying RRR rule is enhanced when φ is
larger. Therefore, we do not include charts regarding policy intensity experiments here, and they
are available from authors upon request.
3.2.2 Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
The general observation that emerges from ﬁgure 4 is that the time-varying RRR policy dampens
the impact of the ﬁnancial accelerator on key macroeconomic real and ﬁnancial variables at the
expense of higher inﬂation in response to TFP shocks.
In the economy with ﬁxed RRR, as expected, households reduce their demand for consumption
and supply of deposits in response to the adverse TFP shock since output and the proﬁts that
accrue from the ownership of banks and capital producers are lower. On the banks’ side, the
12Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), Meh and Moran (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Curdia and
Woodford (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Iacoviello (2010), and Mimir (2011).
13The dynamics of the economy with no reserves are available upon request.
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reduced TFP highlights the reduction in the proﬁtability of equity loans to ﬁrms, inducing them
to reduce their demand for deposits.
Under ﬁxed RRR economy, as ﬁgure 4 shows, the net worth of banks collapse by 4% reﬂecting
the feedback eﬀect of a 0.6% decline in asset prices through the endogenous capital constraint
of banks, represented by equation (15). The decline in net worth in accordance with the decline
in deposits downsizes the total ﬁnancing for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (see ﬁgure 4). However, since
the decline in bank capital is larger than that of the value of bank assets, the model implies a
countercyclical bank leverage, which increases by 3.5%. On the other hand, the scarcity of funds
for ﬁrms shoots up loan-deposits spreads by about 250 basis points in annualized terms (see the
middle panel of ﬁgure 4). The reduction in the quantity of equities traded and the collapse in
asset prices trigger a downsizing in bank credit of about 0.75%. As a combined outcome of these
dynamics, investment falls by 3.75% and output declines by about 1.75%.
The nominal price level increases (the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4) because the economy is now
less productive in generating output. Hence, inﬂation increases by 0.2 percentage points causing
the real balances demand to decline and consumption velocity of monetary base to increase by
about 1%.
Now, we explain how the credit policy deﬁned by a countercyclical RRR rule mitigates the
impact of the ﬁnancial accelerator on key macroeconomic real and ﬁnancial variables (see the
dashed plots in ﬁgure 4). Since bank credit declines in response to the adverse TFP shock, the
policy rule implies a reduction in the RRR by about 1 percentage point, which can be seen in
the bottom panel of the ﬁgure. This reduces the cost of extending credit for banks and induces a
substitution from reserves balances to loans in the asset side of their balance sheet. Consequently,
the stronger demand for ﬁrm equity stabilizes the price of it on impact, and the peak of decline in
equity price is about 0.2% less than how much it is in the ﬁxed RRR economy. The substitution
in the balance sheet of banks combined with the better outlook of asset prices reduce the collapse
in bank credit from 0.8% to 0.2%. Accordingly, output and investment decline by 1.3% and 3.5%
less than how much they decline in the ﬁxed RRR economy.
The support of the central bank via lower reserve requirements cause credit spreads to rise by
about 150 basis points less compared to the ﬁxed RRR economy over 5 quarters. We emphasize
this ﬁnding because credit spreads introduce an intertemporal wedge to the savings decision of the
aggregate economy and are created by ﬁnancial frictions. The relatively muted response of spreads
stems from the reduced decline in return to ﬁrm equity. The stronger outlook of the economy
reﬂects into the balance sheet of banks and bank capital declines by 4% less compared to the ﬁxed
RRR economy and even increases above its long-run level for 20 quarters, since RRR is lower than
its long-run value for about 30 quarters. The immediate implication of stronger trajectory of net
worth is a rise of virtually zero in bank leverage on impact (against a 3.25% hike with ﬁxed RRR)
and even implies a decline of it up to 2% caused by the increase in bank capital.
The substantial collapse in reserves demand (about 20%) drives down the price of money and
ampliﬁes the upwards response of inﬂation obtained in the ﬁxed RRR economy (see bottom panel
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of ﬁgure 4). However, since this immediate surge is transitory and driven by the reserves policy, the
model implies an undershooting of inﬂation in the coming 7 quarters. This implies a substitution
of consumption for leisure on the part of forward looking households and labor supply increases
by 2% more in comparison with the ﬁxed RRR economy. Hence, we obtain the stabilizing impact
of the countercyclical RRR rule on the dynamics of output displayed in the top panel of ﬁgure
4. Consistent with these ﬁndings, demand for real balances collapses on impact but outweighs its
steady state level along the transition and consumption velocity increases by 11% more than the
ﬁxed RRR economy.
To sum up, the countercyclical RRR policy mitigates the impact of ﬁnancial accelerator trig-
gered by TFP shocks on real and ﬁnancial variables at the expense of higher inﬂation. Now, we
explore the dynamics driven by money growth shocks.
3.2.3 Impulse Responses to Money Growth Shocks
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of our model economies in response to a one-standard
deviation positive money growth shock. Figure 5 displays the impulse responses. Although the
impact of a money growth shock on those variables is an order of magnitude smaller than that
of a productivity shock, these ﬁgures deliver the same message as in the previous section that
the time-varying RRR policy mitigates the adverse eﬀects of money growth shocks on real and
ﬁnancial variables driven by the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism while creating higher inﬂation
rates compared to ﬁxed RRR policy.
We should ﬁrstly note that the dynamics of the model with ﬁxed required reserves ratio policy
strongly resemble the properties of a standard stochastic cash-in-advance economy by Stockman
(1981) and Cooley and Hansen (1989). In this sense, we follow the timing assumption of Cooley
and Hansen (1989) that asset markets open ﬁrst for workers, but with the diﬀerence that bt+1 is not
necessarily (and actually never) equal to zero, and higher rates of inﬂation discourage household
savings in the form of deposits. In the end, the general mechanism in this basic model is broadly
summarized by the idea that an expansionary shock to the growth rate of money supply raises
inﬂation rate and induces households to substitute credit goods for cash goods. The reﬂection of
that mechanism to the current model is that consumption and deposit savings decline and leisure
demand increases as implied by equations (3) and (5). Since deposit savings are intermediated to
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ equity ﬁnancing, investment declines in response to a positive money growth
shock. Lower investment and the decline in labor supply then reduce output and consumption.
In the ﬁxed RRR economy, inﬂation rate increases by about 0.2% percentage points on impact.
This reduces hours worked by 0.25% since consumption and deposits are the cash goods and leisure
is the credit good. The fall in household deposits leads to a reduction in bank credit in the form
of equity purchases. As the demand for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ shares decline, the price of equity falls
by 0.07%. The decline in equity prices causes bank net worth to shrink by 0.4% on impact, leading
to a rise in credit spreads by about 20 annualized basis points. Since the cost of ﬁnancing capital
expenditures is now higher for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, investment and output drop by 0.4% and 0.15%,
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respectively. In terms of monetary variables, as inﬂation rate rises, real money balances decrease
and consumption velocity surges by 0.4%.
When the central bank puts the credit policy to work, RRR declines about 0.06 percentage
points as bank credit falls in response to a positive money growth shock. There is an immediate
decline of 1.25% in the reserves, and deposit demand by banks. The reduced cost of extending
credit induces banks to substitute away their assets from reserves to ﬁrm equity, and accordingly
the initial decline in bank credit is 0.07% smaller. As equity purchases by banks are larger, the
decline in the price of equity on impact is totally eliminated in comparison to the ﬁxed RRR policy.
This is reﬂected into the balance sheet of banks and intermediary capital does not decline at all
compared to a reduction of 0.45% in the ﬁxed RRR economy. Furthermore, the rise in credit
spreads are about 15 annualized basis points lower and the stronger trajectory of bank net worth
causes leverage to decline by 0.05% over 5 quarters instead of an increase of about 0.4%. Since
credit spreads are the main source of intertemporal distortion caused by the credit frictions in
ﬁnancial sector, the central bank eﬀectively mitigates the adverse impact of this distortion on the
economy via implementing a lower reserve requirement policy. As another favorable result of these
dynamics, investment falls by 0.3% less in the case of time-varying reserve requirements.
The initial fall in reserves by 1.2% creates an excess supply of monetary base in the economy
and raises the inﬂation rate by 0.25% percentage points to restore equilibrium in the money market
(see ﬁgure 5). Therefore the trade-oﬀ between price and ﬁnancial stability is still evident under
money growth shocks. This causes the real money demand to decline and consumption velocity of
monetary base to rise by 0.6% more. Lastly, we again obtain the undershooting of inﬂation following
the ﬁrst period as opposed to the case with ﬁxed RRR. This feeds back into the consumption-leisure
margin of workers and hours decline by about 0.2% less compared to the ﬁxed RRR economy. This
results in stabilizing output on impact and obtaining 0.1% less decline in it over 5 quarters when
the rule is in place.
3.2.4 Financial Crisis Experiment and Credit Policy
The previous two sections illustrated that the macroprudential reserves policy stabilizes key macroe-
conomic and ﬁnancial variables in response to conventional shocks along the business cycle. In this
section, we explore how countercyclical reserve requirements perform during a ﬁnancial crisis. The
speciﬁc experiment is to consider an exogenous decline in the net worth of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
This shock crudely captures loan losses, asset write-downs or asset revaluations that we observe
in the recent ﬁnancial crisis. As stated in the section 1, it might be thought of as a sharp reversal
in the risk appetite of international investors, which is an exogenous factor that threatens the
ﬁnancial stability of a country such as Turkey.
Although the initial decline in banks’ net worth that we introduce is exogenous, there will be
second round eﬀects that endogenously trigger an adverse ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. The
initial fall in the net worth reduces the amount of bank credit that can be extended to non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms as banks are not able to compensate the decline in their internal ﬁnancing with households’
20
deposits. Since non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms ﬁnance their capital expenditures via bank credit, there will be
a drop in investment, and hence in the price of capital. The value of intermediary capital depends
on asset prices. The endogenous decline in asset prices leads to a further deterioration in banks’
net worth, creating an adverse feedback loop of falling aggregate demand, declining asset prices,
and deteriorating intermediary balance sheets.
Speciﬁcally, we consider an initiating disturbance of a 5% decline in the net worth of ﬁnancial
intermediaries. This disturbance will be a one-time shock and we want to think of it as a rare
event. We analyze the eﬀects of this shock in the model economy with ﬁxed RRR policy and
then illustrate the mitigating eﬀects of time-varying RRR policy on real, ﬁnancial and monetary
variables. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of real, ﬁnancial and monetary variables under
diﬀerent policy regimes.
In the economy with ﬁxed RRR, the negative net worth shock immediately reduces bank capital
by 11% on impact (see the middle panel of ﬁgure 6). Although deposits rise due to banks’ increased
demand for deposits to compensate the decline in their internal ﬁnancing, the deterioration of bank
capital causes total ﬁnancing by ﬁnancial intermediaries to shrink. This translates into a reduction
in bank credit in the form of equity purchases to ﬁrms by 1.2% on impact. As the demand for
ﬁrms’ shares is lower, the price of equity falls by 1%. This ampliﬁes the exogenous impact of the
ﬁnancial shock via endogenous capital constraint of banks and explains the substantial decline of
11% in the net worth. The decline in bank capital rises their leverage by 10% on impact. Induced
by the shortage in credit and collapse in asset prices, credit spreads rise by 450 basis points in
annualized terms. This in turn causes ﬁrms to cut back their investment severely (by about 6%)
due to lower bank credit and higher cost of ﬁnancing.
The increase in bank deposits driven by banks’ eﬀort to compensate for the net worth loss
increases reserves balances by 1% in the ﬁxed RRR economy. This creates an excess demand for
monetary base and inﬂation declines on impact by 0.6 percentage points (see the bottom panel of
ﬁgure 6). However, since the shock is transitory, inﬂation overshoots by 0.7 percentage points in
the period that follows the shock and workers’ expectations regarding the hike in future inﬂation
causes hours to decline by 2.75% on impact. Therefore, output shrinks by 1.6% as shown in the top
panel of the ﬁgure. The dynamics of real balances demand and consumption velocity of monetary
base resemble the expected implication of the dynamics of inﬂation.
In the model economy with credit policy, the time-varying rule induces a fall in the RRR of
about 0.6 percentage points since bank credit declines in response to the negative ﬁnancial shock.
Reserves immediately drop by 11% and eliminate the collapse in inﬂation almost completely. Most
importantly, the dynamics of reserves moves inﬂation in such a way to induce hours and accordingly
output to increase on impact (see the bottom and top panels of ﬁgure 6).
Following the reduced cost of making equity loans to ﬁrms, banks substitute away their assets
from reserves to ﬁrm equity, therefore the initial decline in bank credit is 1% smaller. As the
demand for ﬁrm equity is higher in the model with credit policy, the 1% reduction in the price of
equity is in the model economy with ﬁxed RRR policy is almost totally eliminated. This reinforces
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the intermediary capital via the leverage constraint and reduces the collapse in bank net worth by
5%. We emphasize this ﬁnding that the macroprudential policy reduces the ampliﬁed impact of
the ﬁnancial shock on bank capital by 50%. Accordingly, the rise in credit spreads are 200 basis
points lower in annualized terms and bank leverage increases by 5% instead of 10%. As another
favorable outcome, investment falls by 5% less than the decline in the ﬁxed RRR economy over
5 quarters. To sum up, we obtain the result that a macroprudential reserve requirements policy
that has a ﬁrst order impact on the balance sheet of ﬁnancial intermediaries is the most eﬀective
in the event of a ﬁnancial turmoil.
For all shocks, the higher the intensity of required reserves policy, which is measured by a
larger φ parameter, the lower is the contraction in real macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables.
Most importantly, the adverse hike in credit spreads, which is the indicator of ﬁnancial frictions
in this model economy are eliminated to substantial degrees as the credit policy is implemented
more aggressively. Additionally, as expected, the inﬂationary cost of macroprudential intervention
is also magniﬁed as the policy becomes more intense.
Now we proceed to the next section in which we report the impact of countercyclical reserve
requirement policy on the volatilities of key macroeconomic real and ﬁnancial variables.
3.2.5 Effects of Time-Varying Reserve Requirement Policy on Volatilities
Table 2 displays the volatilities of real and ﬁnancial variables when TFP and money growth shocks
are realized over suﬃciently long simulations of the model economy with three diﬀerent regimes:
(i) ﬁxed RRR, (ii) a moderate required reserve policy (φ = 5.15), and (iii) an aggressive required
reserve policy (φ = 10). As indicated in the table, the economy with a moderate credit policy
features lower volatilities in real variables such as output, consumption, investment as well as in
ﬁnancial variables such as bank credit, loan-deposit spread, and asset prices, compared to the
economy with a ﬁxed RRR policy. Column 4 of the table shows that as the required reserve policy
gets more aggressive, the volatilities of output, consumption, investment, bank credit, loan-deposit
spread, and asset prices are even lower. We especially want to highlight the 50% decline in the
volatilities of credit spreads and leverage ratio, the 22% decline in the volatilities of investment and
asset prices, and 77% decline in the volatility of bank net worth when the moderate credit policy
is in place. Since volatilities over the business cycle are lower under credit policy, we consider
exploring welfare implications of it worthwhile. Accordingly, in the following section, we carry out
welfare comparisons of diﬀerent reserve requirement policies. Finally, we emphasize that as the
time-varying RRR policy gets
3.2.6 Credit Policy and Welfare
We deﬁne the welfare associated with the time-invariant equilibrium given by the countercyclical
reserve requirement policy conditional on a particular state of the economy in period 0 as:
V trp0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ctrpt , l
trp
t ) (61)
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Table 2: Volatilities of Real and Financial Variables
Variable Fixed Reserves Credit Policy (φ = 5.15) Credit Policy (φ = 10)
Real Variables
Output 2.77 2.26 2.07
Consumption 1.59 1.47 1.41
Investment 6.01 4.70 4.22
Hours 0.35 2.44 2.62
Financial Variables
Credit 1.08 0.89 0.82
Deposits 1.22 1.76 2.57
Net Worth 4.35 1.24 1.31
Leverage Ratio 4.04 2.01 2.04
Credit Spread 0.28 0.14 0.12
Asset Prices 0.62 0.48 0.43
Monetary Variables
Inflation 0.18 0.27 0.37
where E0 denotes conditional expectation over the initial state, and c
trp
t and l
trp
t stand for the
contingent plans for consumption and leisure under the time-varying reserve requirement policy.
Similarly, the welfare associated with the time-invariant equilibrium given by the ﬁxed reserve
requirement policy conditional on a particular state of the economy in period 0 as
V frp0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cfrpt , l
frp
t ), (62)
where cfrpt and l
frp
t stand for the contingent plans for consumption and leisure under the ﬁxed
reserve requirement policy.
We then compute consumption-based welfare gains for each alternative time-varying reserve
requirement policy (moderate or aggressive). Let λc stand for the welfare gain of adopting time-
varying reserve requirement policy instead of the ﬁxed one conditional on a particular state in
period 0. We deﬁne λc as the proportional increase of regime frp’s consumption plan that a
household must demand to be as well oﬀ under policy regime trp. Therefore, λc is implicitly
deﬁned by
V trp0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
(1 + λc)cfrpt , l
frp
t
)
(63)
Hence, a positive value for λc implies that the time-varying reserve requirement policy is welfare
superior to the ﬁxed reserve requirement policy.
In order to obtain accurate welfare rankings, we perform a second-order approximation to the
policy functions and the welfare given by V0. It is very well-known that welfare levels would be
equal to each other under alternative policy regimes if we conduct a ﬁrst-order approximation
to the policy functions since the expected value of endogenous variables would be equal to their
non-stochastic steady state levels across all alternative reserve policies. We then deﬁne welfare in
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the following recursive form to conduct a second-order approximation to V0:
V0,t = U(ct, lt) + βEtV0,t+1. (64)
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) show that V0 can also be represented as
V0,t = V0 +
1
2
∆(V0) (65)
where V0 is the level of welfare evaluated at the non-stochastic steady-state, and ∆(V0) is the
constant correction term, denoting the second-order derivative of the policy function for V0,t with
respect to the variance of shock processes. Therefore, equation (65) is an approximation to the
welfare V0,t, capturing the ﬂuctuations of endogenous variables at the stochastic steady state.
We compare three diﬀerent policy regimes in terms of their welfare gains: (i) a ﬁxed reserve
requirement policy, frp, (ii) a moderate time-varying reserve requirement policy (φ = 5.15), mtrp
and (iii) an aggressive time-varying reserve requirement policy (φ = 10), atrp. We ﬁnd that
the welfare gain of the central bank following mtrp rather than frp is 0.06% in consumption-
equivalent welfare terms. Moreover, the welfare gain of the central bank following atrp rather than
frp is 0.22% in consumption-equivalent welfare terms. These results indicate that following an
operational time-varying reserve requirement policy is always welfare improving compared to an
inactive reserve policy. Additionally, on quantitative grounds, these welfare gains are non-trivial
as far as closed economy models are concerned.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
There are certain advantages and drawbacks of using reserve requirements to achieve ﬁnancial
stability. The main advantages are (i) it is one of the two main policy tools that most central
banks can use, (ii) the central bank does not directly face any costs since reserve requirements
eﬀectively alter the ﬁnancial sector’s own balance sheet in order to provide liquidity to the system,
and (iii) the central bank can employ reserve requirements without requiring banks to have low-
risk assets as collateral, which is unlike the re-discount window. On the other hand, there are
some drawbacks of using reserve requirements, including (i) their role as a tax on the banking
sector, putting depository institutions at a competitive disadvantage compared to unregulated
ﬁnancial institutions, and (ii) they may lead to rise in the credit spreads as they put additional
costs on ﬁnancial intermediation. One can assess the eﬀectiveness of reserve requirements as a
ﬁnancial stability tool through their eﬀects on credit spreads and bank credit to non-ﬁnancial
sector. Other things being equal, we expect countercyclical implementation of reserve requirement
ratios to mitigate the decline in credit growth and accordingly moderate the rise in credit spreads
in economic downturns, and curb excessive credit growth in boom periods.
To that purpose, we build a quantitative monetary DSGE model with a banking sector that is
subject to time-varying reserve requirements imposed by the central bank and endogenous capital
constraints due to an agency problem. We model reserve requirements as an exogenous policy
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rule that countercyclically responds to credit growth in the ﬁnancial sector in a forward looking
sense. We consider the eﬀects of three diﬀerent types of shocks: productivity, money growth and
ﬁnancial shocks. For each type of shock, we ﬁnd that the time-varying required reserve ratio rule
mitigates the negative eﬀects of adverse shocks ampliﬁed by the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
on real and ﬁnancial variables. In each case, it reduces the intertemporal distortions created by the
credit spread at the expense of generating higher inﬂation, pointing out the clear trade-oﬀ between
price stability and ﬁnancial stability faced by many central banks nowadays. It also reduces the
volatilities of key variables such as output, consumption, investment, bank credit, loan spread and
asset prices, indicating the role of reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy instrument.
Finally, we ﬁnd that a time-varying reserve requirement policy achieves a higher welfare than a
ﬁxed reserve requirement policy.
This study illustrates that when ﬁnancial frictions are important, monetary policy that adopts
macroprudential reserve requirement ratios as an instrument might have real eﬀects even if there
are no nominal or real rigidities. Our work is also timely in the sense that academicians and policy
makers are expressing their doubts about inﬂation targeting contemporaneously, and accordingly,
quantity of money has emerged as an explicit policy instrument.
There are several further research avenues: one can introduce liquidity shocks in order to bring
a microfoundation to holding reserves in order to rationalize the optimality of positive reserve
requirements. It might also be interesting to focus on the tradeoﬀ between price stability and
ﬁnancial stability in a framework in which an interest rate feedback rule is introduced under
nominal rigidities such as Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Lastly, it
might also be worthwhile to study an open economy model to explicitly consider the eﬀects of
international capital ﬂows in the design of required reserves policies.
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Appendix: Banks’ Profit Maximization Problem
Let’s conjecture that the bank’s franchise value is given by
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnt (66)
Comparing the conjectured solution for Vjt to the expected discounted terminal net worth yields
the following expressions,
νtqtsjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i
[
Rkt+1+i −
(
Rt+1+i − rrt+i
1− rrt+i
)]
qt+isjt+i (67)
ηtnjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i
[
Rt+1+i − rrt+i
1− rrt+i
]
njt+i (68)
Let’s ESPt+i stand for
[
Rkt+1+i −
(
Rt+1+i−rrt+i
1−rrt+i
)]
and let’s RRt+i stand for
[
Rt+1+i−rrt+i
1−rrt+i
]
. There-
fore,
νtqtsjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+iqt+isjt+i (69)
ηtnjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iRRt+injt+i (70)
We write νt and ηt recursively using the expressions above. Let’s begin with νt. To ease the
notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
νt =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+ixt,t+i (71)
where xt,t+i =
qt+isjt+i
qtsjt
. Let’s separate (71) into two parts.
νt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1ESPt +
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+ixt,t+i (72)
Rearrange the second term at the right-hand size of the expression (72),
νt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1ESPt + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+iESPt+1+ixt+1,t+1+i (73)
The inﬁnite sum at the right-hand side of equation (73) is one period updated version of equation
(71), given by
νt+1 =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+iESPt+1+ixt+1,t+1+i (74)
where xt+1,t+1+i =
qt+1+isjt+1+i
qt+1sjt+1
.
Hence, we can re-write (73) with the expectations as follows:
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1ESPt + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (75)
Let’s continue with ηt. To ease the notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
28
ηt =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iRRt+izt,t+i (76)
where zt,t+i =
njt+i
njt
. Let’s separate (76) into two parts.
ηt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1RRt +
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iRRt+izt,t+i (77)
Rearrange the second term at the right-hand size of the expression (77),
ηt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1RRt + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+iRRt+1+izt+1,t+1+i (78)
The inﬁnite sum at the right-hand size of equation (77) is one period updated version of equation
(75), given by
ηt+1 =
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+iRRt+1+izt+1,t+1+i (79)
where zt+1,t+1+i =
njt+1+i
njt+1
.
Hence, we can re-write equation (77) with the expectations as follows:
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1RRt + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1] (80)
The proﬁt maximization problem by a representative bank is given by
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+iqt+isjt+i +RRt+injt+i] (81)
s.t. Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (µt) (82)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint. Using
the conjectured solution for Vjt above, we can re-write the intermediary’s maximization problem
using the Lagrangian,
 L = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt + µt[νtqtsjt + ηtnjt − λqtsjt] (83)
The ﬁrst order conditions w.r.t. sjt and µt are given respectively by
(1 + µt)νtqt = µtλqt (84)
Vjt − λqtsjt = 0 (85)
Rearranging (84) gives us the following expression,
νt =
µtλ
(1 + µt)
(86)
Therefore, we establish that the incentive compatibility constraint binds (µt > 0) as long as
expected discounted marginal gain of increasing bank assets is positive.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Required Reserve Ratios in Turkey
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Figure 2: Negative Productivity Shocks
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Figure 3: Positive Money Growth Shocks
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse TFP Shock
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Money Growth Shock
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Financial Shock
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